64 Be\'an Greenslade become steeped in Lhe field and who work wilh_ those !rom union and em~loyer ranks. 2 City professionals removed from commerce m1ght th1~k .that, bu~ fro~t-~t?e managers, marketers and supervisors know there is usually a "conl.lnu1ng relationship 1n ~omr:'.erce, just as with staff. While lawyers and oth~r protessio.nals make contracts , plat~ CIUzens do deals . The difference is a deal's on-gomg nature 1n contrast to the snapshot Ideal of a contract. Nonetheless, traditional courts of general jurisdiction do look to black-letter law to resolve contractual snap-shots of such continuing deals.
So what, if anything, is it about employment courts which means ~hey should. , or are better equipped to, take a uniquely "continuing" vievl of employment d1sputes?
(a) The training of employment Court judges does not especially fit them for resolving employment. disputes from a ''continuing relationship" viewpoint. Their training is similar to that of general jurisdiction judges. 3 (b) Indusuial parties do not bring employment disputes to employment courts to get "continuing" decisions. Just as Jane and John Citizen bring their gripes to conventional civil courts to get a ruling on , a problem which they can't sort out themselves, not (pace the popular penchant for everyone to 'counsel', and 'mediate') to get wide-ranging advicestill less, God forbid, decisions -on their "continuing relationships".
(c) Deciding on continuing relationships gives the imaginative, aggressive disputant scope to manipulate t.he court as an active weapon in rea1-life relationship 4 (d) His Honour refers to the lay members who used to sit with the judges on the Arbitration Court. In their submissions on the Labour Relations Bill, employers protested the tendency sometimes perceived of conciliation by the Court and adjudication by the conciliators, insisting that the Court was there to adjudicate disputes (of right), not to arbitrate or mediate or conciliate.
(e) Lay advocates in employment courts bring a penumbra of union or employer views, in addition to legal argument. Sometimes when the prime parties' dispute has shal]) collective significance (especially ideological or tactical), the union and employer central organisations are attracted, which is provided for in the statute.
(f) Plain citizens in dispute with one another know that no third party could ever understand fully the real ramifications of their "continuing felationships". That is why they bring, not their relationship for counselling, but t.heir dispute for adjudication.
The unique strength and prime function of any court lies in its use of adversarial trial procedures to bring forth facts through evidenoe publicly examined on oath, to advance arguments of statute and case law, to apply those to the tested facts, and to then sift all that with unbiased critical logic to arrive at a legal decision on the evidenced facts which is 2 3 4 This view is common. For ẽxample, it is repeated in Vranken and Hince~ 1987 which also refers to comments of the Minister of Labour, the Hon. Stan Rodger, during the second reading o~ the 1986 Bill, reported in The Dominion, 13 May 1987, p.2 , "that buying and selling labour d1d not amount to just another , economic market . . . [it] had an additional element, namely the need tor a continuing working relationship between the buyers and sellers .. Only one general jurisdiction speciality • the Pamily Court engages in particular training in sens~tising lhe judiciary to human felalionships. Ironically, it. probably has more w do with relauonships which are dis-continuing, than continuing ! Family Court parties are a Piime example. Employment courts can be another. consistent with prior similar cases. That the decision as to liability should be of strict legal rationality, in no way runs counter to the application of a remedy which accords with "equity and good conscience". For the black letter mentality to prevail to the point of liability, then to be overtaken by equitable remedies, seems a desirable attitude for courts of both employment and general jursidiction. So · employment disputes and courts ~e not inherently unique vis-a-vis general legal problems and fora. Quite the contrary.
"large employers with their greater economic power''
It is surprising to see such a hoary chestnut fall from such a height Large employers have great ẽconomic power, but so do large unions. And large employers are also very vulnerable -and in ways and to degrees that large unions are not ~rimarily because of their privileged position of de facto compulsory union membership). There is no general, overwhelming advantage to employers. Often the contrary is true.
"may even destroy effective unionism."'
The phrase~~~ effective unionism" begs a vast nun1ber of questions. If used to justify strike action as the countervailing power to employers' "greater economic power", it is quite inadequate. Damaging as strikẽs are, they simply do not balance the fundamental employer power which comes from the employers fundamental function of organising satisfaction of consumer wants. The r, eal cost of strikes is that they poison the workeremployer felationship in favour of the aggrandisement of more ren1ote union officials' power, and r, educe the sharẽholders' and employer's confidence which in turn inhibits investm, ent and so reduces available jobs.
"Effective unionism" has nothing to do with strikes over inflating wage rate demands or unproductive manning levels, but rather the very sharpest critical analysis of management competence and board of director vision in conceiving and developing new products and services, in getting the most cost-productive plant, in putting together the most imaginative and risk-proof financing deals. Effective unionism in that sense would be a top-flight blend of investigativẽ journalism, technological commentary, and broker's backroom financial analysis, aimed firndy at demanding capitalist excellence from the cusl.Odians of capital.
The Baking Trades v , General Foods6 .interim injunction
The dissenting view in this case was that because the Arbitration Court · was a specialist employment Court, employment disputes should frrst be litigated fully in it before finding their limited way to any collateral or superior Court Until that route was first exhausted, there was no jurisdiction in the High Court to issue injunctions in labour disputes covered by the Industrial Relations Act. That view is quoted selẽctively ad nauseam both by Typically, large , employers are heavily capitalised employers. High capital/labour ratios are generally desirable becase the more the dollar backing-per-arm, the greater productivity and chance for profit. But conversely, high fix. ed capital investment is a hostage to the union activist. Pressure on the firm's windpipe cuts off the oxygen of its cash-flow, leaving it to choke on the sludge of its overheads, particularly its loan servicing costs. It is respectfully suggested that the conventional judicial presumption of a blanket refusal to entertain specific performance of personal service agreements, is a judicial fiction when extended to collective agreements. Do judges really think employers negotiate collective agreements and settle the employment contract with the intention that the workers can withdraw their labour at will? This legal fiction sees employment from the union point of view (not the workers' nor lhe employer's). Granted that judges are now bound by tllis rule; but irs a chain of their own making, and one which is offensive to the commonsense of Lhe people who actually work at the workplace. Neither employer nor worker would, in general, enter into a contract of employment realistica)]y expecting to be able : to strike at wi11. If that was discussed at the engagement interview, and lhe worker insisted upon that righ~ it's a fair bet the worker would never get engaged. So the doctrine is a judicial gift to the unions. But it was not argued in the Court of AppeaL 13 At the level of our highest local court, judicial courage should doubtless be welcomed; but it should fly on the wings of counsels' argument. Imagination alone should be expressed in seminars, conferences, or articles, rather than from the Bench on a case of specific facts.
New aaland
A feature of the employment court's jurisdiction was the discretion to hear the central organisations. 14 Central organisations have no such statutory rights of discretionary appearance in the Court of Appeal. His Honour himself actually over-rode one of the very features of the Act whose general pre-eminence he sought to promote.15 His Honour's dissenting judgment was truly obiter dictum . Be~ore the 1987 Act, the courts of general jurisdiction had a clear power (and duty) to entertain injunction proceedings in industrial, no less than other, matters. The conventional Courts' reluctance to deal with industrial injunctions was viewed by ẽmployers at best with puzzlement.16
The Baking Trades case's twin forces of (a) apparent general judicial reluctance to order injunctions to stop strikes which were not lawful, and (b) His Honour's argument for prior jurisdiction of the employment court, led to a common view that Industrial Relations Act section 48 (2) (d) co. mpliance orders needed first to be attempted and exhausted in the Arbitration Court before High Court injunctions were sought. That was unfortunate for two reasons:
(a) I believe it was : mistaken. The High Court would issue injunctions in industrial disputes if the strict criteria were carefully met and proven; and (b) In practice, the Arbitration Court proceedings were notoriously slow compared to the commercial 13 I sat through the two days of the case and cannot recall the point being in issue. Indeed, ' Thorp,J. statesThe question whether the Industrial Relations Act 1973 gave the Arbitration Court exclusive jurisdiction in industrial disputes ... was not at . any stage before the Court in these proceedings because both counsel for the appellants accepted that the Act did not have that effecL
Õne of the counsel accepted the High Court had a "last resort" jurisdiction; the other union counsel "did not contend that injunctions had no place in industrial law''.
14 Explicitly recognised in both statutes. 15 And that merely tlu:ough the inference of a privative interprẽtation of jurisdiction of a power not addressed at all in the said Act, namely injunctions. 16 And at worst by the most outspoken and less inform. ed employers as bias, which in n1ore ex· treme comment was phrased as a fear of decisions with political overtones. Since union voices expressed the opposite view on the rare occasions that injunctions were won by employers, one can feel sympathy for the judiciary caught between the rock and the hard places of involved public opinion. Yet that is ultimately the nature of their job -the reason for their judicial immunity from suit The author reveals early a fundamental sympathy for the view that "the industrial relations system" is sufficiently important to desrve protection by legislation to survive19. Since there is no present likelihood of the industrial relations system not doing so, it may be presumed that means that trade unions especially deserve such protection. Anderson does not test the respective rights protected or threatened20 by "the intrusion of the common law", but it may be presumed that it is individual rights that arẽ protected, and collective rights that we threatened. E· mployers do generally support such common law "intrusion" simply because they believe individual rights ar, e fundarnental. I suspect Anderson may not shaJie that predisposition.
Employers acknowledge the common law to be based "on individual, property-based values and on a particular notion of freedom of contract" (p. 95).. But that acknowledgment of an assumption is not, per se , a "flaw both in principle and in fact", or "a facade", as Anderson asserts. Still less is it an "attack[ on] the concept of democratic government". There is at least an arguable case that de-regulated commercial markets are more "democratic" and ẽquitable than some of our merely political institutions of government, with their party-coagulated interests which have a propensity to trade off real equities in one social sector (e.g consumers' household economies through high personal 17 Even when urgency was determined upon. the sheer fewness and geographical concentration of that Court's judges compared to the largẽ numbers , and dispersion of High Court judges meant that 24-hour or less re~onses were virtually impossible. So the unions usually could wring out a t:ew more days' strike action, and the employer was left to cany losses for a further time.
The argument that damages could be sought was often hollow, f:or unions werẽ frequently "unions of straw", or alternatively very strong. concentrated unions could simply repeat the damage -this time over the temerity of the ẽmployer in trying to seek those damages.
l8 Anderson, G (1987) .The reception of the economic torts into New Zealand labour law: a preliminary discussion New Zealand journal of industrial relalions 12 (2) :89-100 l9 "Until recently the major intervention by statute was intended to protect the industrial relations system from the potentially tkvastating intrusion of the common law."-p.92 (my emphasis).)
While the industrial relations system is often useful to production economics, a threat that something might "devastate" it, by itself, does not persuade ' that that 'something' is therefore bad, or even worse that the pr, esent industrial relations system and its derivative 'industrial relations club' of academics (like Anderson) and interest-group advocates (like myself) therefore needs sustaining. 20 If Anderson wants to argue the superiority of political institutions over markets, that's fme, and a contribution on that point of JX>litical philosophy would be awaited with interest. But if his purpose is to persuade those of us who share the widely-known and openly-acknowledged basic assumption of common law (that it is individually-and property-based) that we arẽ wrong in asserting common law superiority to "poHtical" law, lhen il is logically not suf: ficient for him merely to state that assumption. It is not sufficient to lea. ve the argument at that point with a rhetoricaJ question as to the appropriateness in the New Zealand context õf "incorporating these attitudes."
Strikes, injunctions and complianc, e orders 69 income tax) against perceived equities in others (e.g universal, non-tested welfare benefits), to the ultimate damage of equity in both.21
Anderson characterises the failure of the Ocean Beach prosecutions as a "debacle", as though the criminal sanctions failed because they were inherently ineffective in indusLriaJ relations. This is not so. The sanctions failed to proceed because prosecutions w, ere in the hands of the Labour Department, and there was not the political 22will to press multiple individual chargẽs. 23 It is to be noted that now there are civil, not criminal, remedies; and the suit lies at the initiative of a party, for example the employer. Litigation will be on the calculation of lhe individual party; the commercial, not the political, values will predominate.2 4 Where employers cannot recover commercial losses by strike action from unions, the new de-regulated commercial environment and the floating exchange rate will together mean, firstly that competition will lessen the suffering company's market share, and secondly that diversion or relocation of investn1ent overseas will become more attractive or even a matter of survivaJ.25
Economic torts were not ever actually "outside the mainstrearn of labour law in New Zealand". Such economic damage was usually able to be absorbed by companies supplying the local markets in the cost-plus pricing policies 'vhich then obtained. Consumers are now telling employers through the market-place 'that they must now no longer tolerate intransigent union head-banging attacks to advance the interests of only one of several factors of production. 25 That export companies 1 that is ov, erseas consumers and customers, would eventually rebel seems not to have been realised, despite freezing companies' and farm, ers' despairing warnings. Ev, entually, the presence of the real wolf on export markets irnpinged. New Zealand's international competitive position dropped from 2nd to 25th. So much for those with faith that politicians, rather than competitive markets. should determine a counLry's balance of po"'er of
26
Tl its production and consuming factors ' ! Also, there was a long period starting with World War IT and the subsequent "full employment", when it was generally viewed as unacceptable for patriotic, humanist, socially sensitive, or simply ipolitical', reasons to seek legal , compensation for economic dan1age suffered in industrial disputes. It was the welfarism and protectionism which was out of step, not economic torts. The welfarist mentality and the protectionist economy blinkered and blanketed New Zealanders fron1
world market realities. Economic torts are a civilised, legal response to the harsher realities of lost contracts and markets which can follow upon persistent industrial relations anarchy,.
economics, labour law itself has returned to the mainstream of general law. 28 The thesis that there had been an (unqualified) "legislative policy ... that industrial disputes should be settled by a specialist court" was never expressed legislative policy at all: there were always some areas in which the employment court did not have jurisdiction, Iẽaving them by default to the traditional common law courts, and there was probably also always an area of overlap.29 That is stiU the situation.30 .. Torts not specified in section 242 are still available to found actions in the traditional High Court,31 and personal grievance actions are not available to persons who are not members of a trade union at the time of filing their grievance 32. Of course there must still be jurisdiction in the traditional Courts for relief from such wrongs. Industrial law, unlike some other divisions of law which have been codified, is historically too young, and developing too continuously, to be successfully codified. When certain areas of it do become clearly seen, the legislature has seen fit to give exclusive responsibility for those areas to the specialist court The rest is best left open, lest relief tor some wrongs be inadvertently precluded.
The present Act has separated off the arbitral functions of the previous court to an Arbitration Commission, and (largely) removed the tripartite worker and employer representation on the Bench. This is a clear indication to the Labour Court judiciary that the legislation wants thetn to get on with the business of adjudicating on employment disputes as the parties pfesent the cases and on the agreements the parties have actually reached. It frees the judiciary from the contradictory role previously asked of it, that it be some inappropriate mix of conciliator, mediator, and policy interpreter, in addition to and in the process of actually being an adjudicator. The post-1984 attitude is that that business is going to try hard to recover compensation ~or its wounds. After 1987, it has some marginally clearer tools to use in a court which is both familiar and historically acceptable to the offender -tools such as the more explicit compliance order, the injunction and the economic torts.
Martin Vranken -Applicabillty of common law in industrial relations36
Vranken's thesis is that "the con1mon law" (and he has in rnind particularly dan1agcs actions for strikes) "is inappropriate in dealing with industrial action". His reason is that "it risks jeopardising the very concept of the social autonon1y of industrial lavl." The fallacy is the assumption of "the social autonomy of industrial law". En1ployment la\v is not uniquely different from conventional law, as is often c1airned37 Frorn the business point of view, the consumer is para, mount; business is the agent of the consumer's satisfaction and the employer the personality of the business; and labour is but one input to the business in providing consumer satisfaction. The notion that industrial law is unique proceeds fro1n the reverse order of priorities : the population collectively must., for humanist reasons, consu, me (eat, shelter, clothe, war1n); consu1nption requires purchasing power, both for worker-consumers and for the producing business (to move the inventory -the Keynesian 'ẽffective aggregate demand' thesis); purchasing power con1cs from remuneration; remuneration requires employment; so ag&rregate consumption requires collective employmenr.38 Industrial law disciplines the employment environn1cnt collectively, and so is unique amongst laws in that it is essentially collective. Employers reject that notion. It is the satisfaction of consumer demand which generates the demand for labour and employment. In any ẽvent, to argue that collective employn1ent relationships are paramount as shown by the collective jurisdjction of the Labour Court is circular : the Labour Court was constituted to deal with collective relationships.39 It is the statute that makes them unique: not vice versa.40 41 on the unions. And some employers thought "suing the pants off' an errant union \\'as being too hard. (Cp. Haigh's article, p.ll9 : " ... but its use in the past has been voluntarily curtailed by employers themselves.") But that attitude has substantially changed since the radical deregulation of 1984 and afterwards. Etnployers now no longer have the cushions of crosssubsidisation. The true costs of various actions taken against a firm are now more clearly and more quickly seen -by management themselves, and by Lhe owners and Lhe financial analysts who judge the managers. The possible range of success and failure has been tremendously widened : the very good succeed excellently; but lhe mediocre and the soft touch stick out like sore thumbs. Haigh answers "yes". SpccificalJy, "Compliance orders will supersede injunctions as the most effective remedy ' tO prevent ongoing breaches of industrial awards or agreements." If ''most effective" means rnost numerous, I agree. The procedure is not as technical, and so is n1ore easily accessible to a \vider range of advocates on both sides. It may be that a cornpliance order is only really effective because it is backed up by the mysterious "Injunction" \vhich strikcth frorn heaven like a lighLning bo1t, and the awful "Damages In Economic Tort" suit which can crush the wicked with a burden which robs them of all their financial Enna-G for years to come. Black hun1our 4 3 aside, the effectiveness of the compliance order is in part due to its being seen by boisterous unions as a lesser and less aggressive rernedy; and thus sornewhat more acceptable to them. 44 All of this goes back to the earlier Hughes thesis that the effectiveness of the Court depends on the "acceptance" of the unions of the ren1edies meted out There has been the feeling that if the Court applied the full sanction of the law rigorously, the unions would cease to bring their grievances to the Court and would instead "hit the bricks", which is taken as clearly not "improving" [1973 If an employer wishes to vlam a union in a tone of medium severity, it files a compliance order; (if it is more serious, it files an injunction or tort; and if if it is totally exasperated, it hangs a damages clain1 on the injunction or tort). After all, the days or weeks it can take to get a compliance order to Court gives grace for a goodly strike -no swift lightning bolt there; and no damages can be a\varded under the compliance order -no crushing weight of punishment there.
Indeed, some employers, unionists, and lawyers have speculated just that as a result of the 1987 Acl, saying that : the injunctions and damages actions are too technical, alienating the nonlegally-trained advocates; the injunctions and damages are too effectively punitive; the loss of n1e1nber's representing worker-employer interests tneans unions no longer feel they have a 'f:iend' a.L Court; the unions can put prompter and n1ore effective pressure on unions through drrecl actton. files a compliance order application in Court That same afternoon the employer receives a fax from the union's lawyer, which reads (in part) :
As of 2.00 pm today, the union withdraws its strike action for the teaspoon allowance of $5.00 per week.
As of 2.05 pm today, members of this union, the ABC IUOW and of two others, the PQR.IUOW and the XYZ.IA. OW, employed by your firm are on strike in support of a composite agreement, full details of the claims of whi~h will. be forwar,ed to you soon. Meanwhile, we advise that one of those clatms w11l be for tncreased remuneration of $5.00 per week teaspoon allowance. Second (or subsequent) level bargaining is alive and well.
(c) Is a compliance order really "the primary remedy for a breach"?
Tvvo unions have a chronic demarcation dispute history. An employer is in a vulnerable industry, or at a vulnerable time. The first union strikes for an agreement to secure to itself all of the disputed work at that employer. The employer's crop will spoil in 3 days; or the last export ship or flight arriving pre-Christmas in London leaves in 3 days; (or whatever). Even with urgency, the queue of cases means it takes 2 weeks to get a compliance order application betore the Court-or one week for an injunction. This is not a commercial response time. Worse, there is some evidence, and a general belief, that the Court administration favours a certain creative delay in letting such applications get heard be Core a Judge. "Things work themselves out", a little strike massage is inevitable and there£ore acceptable, it eases the Court's case load. This is not acceptable administration.
Actually, notwithstanding section 186 (f) and section 230 (e), · mediation is really perceived as the "primary" remedy for disputes, even of non-compliance. But what incentive is there on the union to attend urgent mediation (which cannot punish non-attendance}, when the enforcement of the mediation procedure is still remote in tirne ? Why not wring out a few 1nore days' industrial pressure ?
In the Fletcher Construction v Northern Labourerers Union compliance order case 50, the Judge held that the evidence was that the cause of the strike by members of the Labourers Union against their contractor-employers (not Fletchers) by refusing delivery of only Fletchers materials (cement, timber, steel) on to Auckland sites, was a demarcation dispute betweeen labourers and engineers over rigging down at Kawerau. The applicants were not 'the employers of the strikers; so no compliance order could issue at their suit. The strike was "reprehensible", but the Court could offer no compliance order remedy. This was exactly the situation of secondary industrial action for which the Employers Federation pleaded ~or femedies in subn1issions to the 1986 Labour Relations Bill.
In the same case, the Judge refered to the Bay Milk case51 in which he refused a compliance order application over breach of award through failing to follow disputes procedure, on the ground that "since the demarcation was about to be heard. procedure, one cannot but ask how a judge52 can rank a particular dispute of a class of disputes as "larger" than a procedure to deal with all examples of that class. Surely procedure is "larger" than a particular substance; and that a Judge must labour to achieve particular substantive justice within general prcx>edures.53 54
The Long Tille of the 1987 Act refers to "orderly conduct of" and the 1973 Act to "improving, industrial relations?". If a judicial belief that a union or a group of \\'Orkers may continue to feel aggrieved and continue industrial action in this or another strike, which is clearly not" good industrial relations", is sufficient ground for a judge to decide not to rnake a judgment enforcing some particular discretionary rernedy of the Act, then employers state strongly that they believe that adhering to procedures in statute or agreed by the parties is also, and more fundamental I y, good industrial relations. Whether unions like that or not, or will continue a specific strike, is subordinate to such sanctity of agreement. 55 It should be remembered that e. mployers can have "equity" on their side, too. It is hard to believe that the discretion not to issue the compliance order should have been exercised on the grounds of the · mere existence of another simultaneous cause.
If a union calls a strike of so1ne of its · members, within 60 days of expiry of its award, over two issues, one lawful (say, the r· e-negotiation of its award) and a one unlawful (say, a demarcation dispute), can (should? would?) the Court issue a compliance order? This question exposes the conceptual problem of multiple causes of industrial action where the Act expects only single causes. . The Court might strive to delvẽ into the facts of each case so as to separate some workers' striking over (say) redundancy from other workers' sttiking over the disputes of interest. Yet there will, at tin1es, be fact situations with genuinely joint strike issues, one lawful and one unlawful. Will the Court interpret the Act to give priority to continuation of work or to bargaining leverage? The ans\ver to be given by the Court will be read by practitioners as a policy judgement akin to legislation.A small step towards a solution might be to consider requiring strikers to give \Vritten reasons for a strike. , with the proviso that where those reasons arẽ sho\vn not to properly identify all the relevant reasons, the strike thereby becomes unlawful. "Reasons for a strike" would redress a present imbalance between strikes and lockouts. Lockouts, in order to justify non-payment of wages, require an employer to lay son1e demand on the workers 56 If section 233 were amended in that way, it would require a party taking industrial action to provide identification of all the causes of, and thus reasons for, the dispute, which \vould in itself be a major step towards resolving it. It would also provide the Court with reliable evidence upon which to discriminate between lawful and unlawful action 57 58(However, it is acknowledged that the usual problems of evasion and evidence exist for unions detennined to avoid such provisions.) Identification and evidencing the policy an1biguity as to \vork continuation and bargai~ing_ leverage, does not ~f . .itself resolve the contradiction. Ernployers want a clear legtslative statement that striking or locking out over i1nminent re-negotiations of a dispute of .interest is Ia:vf~l on/~ when that is the only issue in dispute. Confusion with other 1ssues should d1squahfy that protection.
Conclusion
Industrial relations theorists have for many years cast industrial relations in a framework of personified classes, workers and employers, whose relations are predicated upon conflict. The so-called 'unitary model' ("let's all bake a bigger cake", "we're all in it together'') has been represented as 'pollyanna'. Instead, ern players' and workers' different goals have been treated as equally valid (when 'worker' values haven't actually predominated). The following suggests a different view which is believed to re'flect better business opinion of priori ties. The reason there are any jobs at all, whether in e: mployment or contracting, is that some people called ''consumers" want, and are prepared. to pay for, some goods or services. Such work is the only reason for jobs. All other so-called 'work' is disguised welfare. It is the function (not the 'right'; but rather the 'duty') of management to rneet consumer demand, and to do so as efficiently and effectively as possible. One of the vlays for management to meet consumer demand is to organise labour productively and strengthen its . muscle and mind with capital and motivation.
Two inferences can be drawn Firstly, management goals/duties are socially more fundamental than those of workẽrs, because they are more totally and immediately related to satisfying consumers. Secondly, and as a corollary, unions would have more leverage wiU1 manage1nent if they identified 1neans of satisfying consumers which are superior to current management practice (because mangemenCs clients would then support the workers), than by interfering with consumer satisfaction by interruptions. At present, any apparent union gains frorn industrial action are usua1Iy Pyrrhic.
Strikes ahnost al\vays ultimately cost workers more than employers, since management has the general support of owners on wider issues above and beyond employment, and can often, in the medium term, rernove the employment from Ne· w Zealand or transfonu it to minimise strike affects. \\ 1 here strike damage cannot be avoided or minimised, the service itself becomes run down or rnade non-competitive or both. The im. mediate effect of that is that future jobs are not created, and present jobs are threatened. While not striking will not create employment (that's a different problem), strikes white-ant e. mployment.59 The more open New Zealand's econon1y, the more de-regulated its markets, then the more essential is union leadership which irnproves its members' remuneration and conditions by rnaking suggestions on manage. ment and direction \Vhich are better than the present
